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Martinez Guzman (Wilber) v. Dist. Ct. (State), 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (Sep. 30, 2021)1
NO PLACE LIKE HOME: CLARIFYING ACTS, INTENT, AND INTERCOUNTY VENUE
Summary
Martinez Guzman was indicted by a grand jury for five burglaries and four murders
occurring in two counties. In Martinez Guzman I, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated an order
denying dismissal for improper jurisdiction and remanded for reconsideration. There, the court
held that territorial jurisdiction depends on whether the necessary statutory connections to the
location of the court exist. 2 Here, the court again granted a writ of mandamus for Martinez
Guzman. Because the court concluded the nexus between acts committed in one county were not
sufficiently connected to offenses occurring in another, it considered the district court’s venue
determination to be a manifest abuse of discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court thus ordered that
the alleged Douglas County crimes charged in Washoe County must be dismissed.
Background
Martinez Guzman was charged with five burglaries and four murders at three homes over
two weeks. He stole twice from outbuildings at the David home in Washoe County. There, he took
a revolver and ammunition. Within the week, he used that gun to kill Constance Koontz and Sophia
Renken and burglarize their residences in Douglas County. He then returned to the David home,
burglarizing it and killing Gerald and Sharon David. Four days later, Martinez Guzman was
arrested. He confessed to committing the crimes after he had observed the homes as a landscaper.
He told police he drove the same car to each of the properties; in the car, police discovered a
revolver, ammunition, a name tag from the David home, and a pendant and document from the
Koontz home.
A grand jury in Washoe County indicted Martinez Guzman for ten felonies. But Martinez
Guzman argued that under state statute, the grand jury did not have jurisdiction to indict him for
the Douglas County charges.3 The district court determined that the court’s territorial jurisdiction
extended statewide and denied the motion to dismiss.4 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the
defendant’s writ of mandamus, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case for the
lower court to determine whether venue would be proper in Washoe County for the Douglas
County charges based on a sufficient connection between the acts and offenses. 5
At the rehearing, Martinez Guzman argued that proper venue was not established under the
two relevant state statutes. The state argued that venue was supported by those statutes and others.
Again, the district court concluded that Washoe County was an appropriate venue for all charges
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and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Martinez Guzman then petitioned the Nevada
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the district court’s venue determination
was a manifest abuse of its discretion.
Discussion
As an initial matter, the court noted that mandamus was proper to address the salient,
disputed issue of what is the sufficient connection between where a crime is committed and where
it is charged that must exist to make venue proper.
Neither the formation of intent or preparatory acts standing alone provide a basis for venue
NRS 171.030 provides that when a crime “or the acts or effects thereof constituting or
requisite to the consummation” of the crime occur in more than one county, either is an appropriate
venue.6 The state argued that venue was proper because intent was necessary to commit the
Douglas County crimes and it could have been formed in Washoe County. But the court found that
assuming an element of the crime is an “act or effect” would conflate actus reus and mens rea.
Based on statutory interpretation, the court held that intent is not an “act” and is thus an insufficient
statutory basis for venue, unless accompanied by an action furthering that intent.
The court then addressed an issue of first impression: whether alleged preparatory acts for
an offense are actions “requisite to the consummation” of that charge.7 The state argued, and the
court rejected, that obtaining the gun in Washoe County predicated the burglaries and murders in
Douglas County. The court referenced analogous state statutes to interpret “preparatory acts” under
NRS 171.030. California courts have held that its nearly identical statute8 allows venue based on
either preparatory acts or the effects of preparatory acts.9 Other jurisdictions, however, have ruled
that even if a crime could not be committed without certain actions, purely preparatory acts are an
insufficient basis for venue.10 Here, the court determined that venue in Nevada cannot lay upon
preparatory acts without evidence to show those actions intended to further the charged offense.
Evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support venue
Next, the court applied the rule to the facts. That is, the court evaluated whether evidence
of a preparatory act in Washoe County plus intent for committing the Douglas County crimes was
presented to the grand jury. The state relied on Walker v. State to argue that venue was proper
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because intent could have been formed in either county.11 The Walker court held that because it
was not possible to provide evidence as to precisely where a crime was committed, venue was
valid in a county where a preparatory or requisite act could have occurred. 12
Here, however, the court concluded the evidence supported the intention to steal from the
Douglas County homes preceded procuring the revolver in Washoe County. The court could not
point to evidence that Martinez Guzman sought to steal the gun specifically—let alone took it in
preparation for the subsequent burglaries and murders. The court noted that actions which may
have been preparatory are distinct from preparatory acts occurring and giving rise to venue in one
county for a crime entirely committed in another. Therefore, the court found that not only was the
state’s theory too speculative but that the evidence did not support venue.
Venue must be supported by evidence that proves more than mere possibilities
NRS 171.060 allows for a county to charge burglary when property is brought there after
being taken from a different county during a burglary.13 The district court agreed with the state’s
argument that venue was proper under this statute because items from the Koontz home were inside
of Martinez Guzman’s car. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, found that the district court
manifestly abused its discretion because the statute only applied to the Koontz burglary and was
still an inappropriate basis for venue. The court concluded that the grand jury was presented with
only the mere possibility that the property was in the vehicle when Martinez Guzman traveled
from Douglas County to Washoe County. Because the state did not show proof by a preponderance
of the evidence, the court determined that venue was inappropriate under NRS 171.060.
Intercounty venue is distinct from interstate jurisdiction and joinder
Lastly, the court concluded intercounty venue cannot rest upon NRS 171.020 or NRS
173.115(1). NRS 171.020 provides that if an act that executes an intent to commit or results in the
commission of a crime occurs within the state, Nevada is a proper venue.14 NRS 173.115(1) allows
the joinder of multiple offenses based on “the same act or transaction” or acts that constitute “a
common scheme or plan.”15 The court found that the former applies to interstate jurisdiction and
the latter does not concern venue at all. Thus, the district court erred in considering these statutes
in addition to those that govern intercounty venue—NRS 171.030 and NRS 171.060.
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Conclusion
The court declined to extend the bounds of venue’s pliancy, 16 deciding that neither intent
nor a preparatory act alone is a sufficient basis for venue. But if a preponderance of the evidence
shows intent coupled with an act, venue may be proper. However, it is not enough to present
evidence that allows the grand jury to merely speculate that intent could have formed in the county
claiming venue.
Dissent
According to the dissent authored by Justice Pickering, almost all courts, including the
Nevada Supreme Court, agree that alleged criminal acts provide the “necessary connection” to
establish proper venue.17 Justice Pickering found that the evidence presented here showed the
nexus between the acts committed in Washoe County and the offenses occurring in a Douglas
County.
Because Nevada and California have nearly identical intercounty venue statutes, Justice
Pickering would interpret § 171.030 in accordance with § 781.18 California courts have held that
venue is permitted in a county where only preparatory acts have occurred and the acts need not
constitute an offense element. 19 That is, venue is proper if a jury can reasonably infer from the
facts that acts committed in one county were likely preparation for the crime committed in
another.20 The dissent’s rule differed from the majority opinion by finding that a sufficient
connection between the forum county and the defendant’s offense related acts, standing alone, may
satisfy Nevada state statute.21
Justice Pickering also asserted that the majority’s factual inquiry of intent posed a
substantive question for the jury that belied Nevada law.22 Rather, he saw the absence of an intent
requirement as a clear implication that the legislature intended for the statute to enable venue
within multiple counties. 23 The justice pointed out that Martinez Guzman confessed to using the
revolver he stole in Washoe County to commit the burglaries and murders in Douglas County.
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Because he found that such evidence formed a sufficient connection to the proposed forum, the
justice saw no legal or practical demand split the charges into two trials in two counties.
Finally, Justice Pickering concluded that venue was proper even under the majority’s
interpretation of NRS 171.030. The state must prove venue by preponderance of the evidence,24
meaning evidence that suggests the existence of the contested fact is more likely than its
nonexistence.25 Martinez Guzman twice stole from the David home in Washoe County without
entering the primary residence and without a weapon. Only after he took the revolver from there
did he burglarize residences and murder occupants in Douglas County. Justice Pickering believed
a reasonable jury could find it was more likely than not that the Washoe County acts were intended
to commit the Douglas County offenses. Thus, the justice found sufficient evidence was presented
to the grand jury and venue was proper in Washoe County under this statute.
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